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 Protecting traditional music under copyright (and choosing not 
to enforce it) 
Luke McDonagh 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines how music is defined and protected under copyright law, with a focus 
on traditional music, and outlines the reasons why, even if their music is protectable, 
traditional musicians might decide not to enforce copyright in their works. The particular 
jurisdiction I focus on is the UK, but the underlying principles of the chapter are relevant to 
copyright elsewhere, for example in the EU, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
This chapter complements the work of Mazziotti in this volume.
1
  
 The next part of this chapter outlines what traditional music is and why it poses a 
challenge to copyright. Section 3 explores how the musical work is defined within UK case 
law as well as in international conventions. Section 4 examines how musicians who add 
originality to the arrangement of a recorded tune or song may be entitled to copyright over 
that arrangement as a musical work in its own right.
2
 Following on from this, the chapter 
argues that it is perfectly possible to protect traditional music under copyright (and to enforce 
it) – but there are cogent reasons why this might not be in the best interests of the process of 
music-making.
3
 Moreover, while there is space for some use of innovative licensing, inspired 
by FOSS and Creative Commons, it should not be viewed as a panacea; instead, 
acknowledgement and maintenance of the social norms within traditional music communities 
is of vital importance, rather than dramatic legal changes. 
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2. WHAT IS ‘TRADITIONAL’ MUSIC AND HOW IS IT RELEVANT TO COPYRIGHT 
LAW? 
What we call ‘traditional’ or ‘folk’ music is generally thought of as old, ancient and pre-
modern.
4
 The terms ‘folk’ and ‘traditional’ music are sometimes used interchangeably, 
though it has been argued that the term ‘traditional music’ is preferable as it more clearly 
implies the ‘process’ of music-making.5 In this chapter I do not make a firm distinction 
between the two terms, but ‘traditional’ music will be used as much as possible, although 
‘folk’ music will be used where related academic literature explicitly uses the term.  
 Historically, traditional music – whether European folk music,6 African-American 
blues and jazz music,
7
 or indigenous music in South America,
8
 Asia
9
 and Africa
10
 – has been 
dependent on a process of person-to-person transmission, rather than a written, documented 
form such as in Western classical music. Today, however, many performers of traditional 
music use some form of documentation to aid their learning, usually recordings or 
transcriptions.
11
 This illustrates one of the most important elements of traditional music: 
although music follows established patterns it is not set in stone; it is in a constant state of 
redefinition. Furthermore, although an established body of public domain tunes/songs exists 
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in many forms of traditional music, the creation of new compositions and arrangements plays 
a key role in maintaining the ‘living tradition’.12 
 My focus in this chapter is on forms of secular traditional music in Europe and North 
America, especially Irish instrumental dance music (e.g. jigs and reels) and African-American 
blues and jazz music (e.g. the 12-bar blues progression).
13
 What marks out these traditional 
forms of music from popular or ‘pop industry’ music is the style of composition and 
performance. Traditional songs and melodies tend to follow accepted patterns, often in line 
with specific dance steps. Jigs are usually comprised of two or three musical parts, played 
repeatedly in 6/8 or 9/8 time, while reels are played in 4/4.
14
 12-bar blues songs are often 
played in 4/4 or 3/4 and tend to feature a minor-based scale played over major chords.
15
 New 
compositions that enter the tradition usually feature familiar rhythms and musical phrases. 
Where authorship is observable it is often viewed along a ‘chain’ of musicians who have 
added their own creativity and variations to an existing tune. If a musician performs or 
records an evocative variation of an old Irish reel it can lead to the musician’s name becoming 
attached to the tune (e.g. ‘Joe Cooley’s Reel’ - associated with the playing of the Irish 
accordion player Joe Cooley); similarly, a blues or jazz musician’s adaptation of an existing 
song can become famous, and perhaps even definitive, within the tradition e.g. ‘Mississippi’ 
John Hurt’s version of ‘Frankie and Albert’).16 
 What makes traditional music an interesting topic for scholars of intellectual property 
is that the authorship and performance of traditional music does not neatly correspond to the 
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commonly accepted copyright model within the music industry. Within that model, pop 
composers are usually easily identifiable as authors and owners of copyright works, whereas, 
in accordance with industry practice, performers have a different role; although they are 
entitled to performers’ rights, they are not viewed as authors or owners of the underlying 
musical compositions.
17
 
 Traditional music is different. For one thing, in the case of older tunes and songs 
within a body of traditional music – many of which are in the public domain or are orphan 
works – it is often impossible to identify a single author or joint authors. Moreover, such 
songs and tunes can exist in several regional and local variants that have arisen from the 
creative arrangement of tunes by skilled performers (such as the Joe Cooley and Mississippi 
John Hurt examples cited above).Yet, new compositions by living authors can become 
accepted as part of the tradition over time. Thus, traditional music brings up many questions 
for copyright lawyers. I do not aim to answer all of them in a single chapter. What I intend to 
explore is whether traditional music can be protected under copyright; and, if it can be 
protected, what options do musicians have should they wish, or not, to enforce their 
copyrights? Finally, I consider the fact that the process of traditional music-making has 
parallels with the experiences of creators across a diverse range of non-conventional spaces, 
including free and open source software (FOSS), comedy, magic and graffiti.
18
 
 One important limitation of this chapter is that I do not intend to deal with the 
complex questions concerning the rights of indigenous or tribal communities in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America to traditional music that forms part of sacred traditions or religious 
ceremonies.
19
 Nonetheless, the two are not mutually exclusive. Some of the problems faced 
by members of traditional or indigenous communities are similar to the challenges faced by 
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e.g. Irish traditional musicians or software programmers, as both make objections to 
individualist notions of copyright.
20
 These objections are founded upon a belief that 
intellectual property law fails to adequately facilitate the processes of cultural innovation 
within their environment.
21
 Given that this chapter evaluates these objections the analysis 
provided has relevance beyond its immediate focus. 
 
3. DEFINING AND PROTECTING THE MUSICAL WORK UNDER COPYRIGHT 
It is not the intention of this chapter to explore the history of copyright in great detail; 
expansive studies on this subject have been undertaken elsewhere.
22
 However, a number of 
relevant points are worth noting regarding the beginning of the relationship between modern 
copyright law and music. Although the first ‘letters patent’ were issued to music publishers in 
England during the late 16th century,
23
 at the time of the enactment of the Statute of Anne in 
1710
24
 music was ‘not thought to be protected’.25 This changed towards the latter half of the 
1700s, when there was a ‘shift in judicial understanding of the possible objects of property’ to 
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encompass music.
26
 In 1777, the seminal decision in Bach v Longman
27
 established that 
musical compositions were covered by the Statute of Anne.
28
 
 Three conditions necessitated the application of copyright protection to music in 
England during the 18th century:
29
 (i) the existence of printing technology; (ii) a general 
acceptance of the concept of ‘intellectual property’ in some form at a governmental level; and 
(iii) a rapidly expanding market for sheet music (and, consequently, a black market in 
‘unauthorised publication of musical works’).30 On this, Deazley notes that it was the 
economic rights of publishers that were of paramount importance to the legislature when the 
Statute of Anne was enacted – not the rights of authors or composers.31 
 Whatever the intent of legislators, the ability to enforce copyright over musical works 
had a tangible effect on the attitudes and practices of major classical composers, who began to 
take a more authorial view of their compositions during the 18th and 19th centuries.
32
 
Interestingly, due to the emphasis on oral learning/transmission and a general lack of 
commerciality, traditional music was relatively unaffected by this – the collective remained 
key, and individual musicians were rarely credited as authors/composers.
33
 Sheet music was 
only of tangential interest in the traditional context, mainly to upper-class collectors of the 
music.
34
 Thus, in the classical field, where music was commercially viable, composers 
increasingly saw themselves as authors; whereas the shift towards individual or ‘Romantic’ 
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authorship did not occur in traditional music until the commercial ‘folk boom’ in the 1960s; 
and even then, collective ideals remained strong in many areas of traditional music, and 
persist to this day. 
 
3.1 International Conventions 
In addition to UK common law and legislative developments, the development of music 
copyright in the centuries since Bach v Longman has been shaped by enactments at the 
international level.
35
 Key here is the Berne Convention of 1886, which has been adopted by 
much of the global community and which provides an international framework for copyright 
in relation to musical works.
36
 Many of its standards also form part of the 1994 TRIPS 
agreement.
37
 
 Berne protects the ‘musical composition with or without words’ and ‘dramatico-
musical works’, but does not define ‘music’ or ‘musical composition’.38 Indeed, there are 
surprisingly few definitions of ‘musical work’ in national and international copyright law. In 
1994 TRIPS merely adopted the terms of the Berne Convention and did not provide a further 
definition of musical work.
39
 The WIPO World Copyright Treaty of 1996
40
 does not attempt 
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to define it. Similarly, the relevant US legislation does not provide a definition.
41
 What this 
indicates is that legislative bodies, both national and international, accept that the terms 
‘music’ and ‘musical work’ are inherently difficult to define (and/or that it is not necessary to 
define the terms strictly for copyright purposes).
42
 Interestingly, as explored in this chapter, 
the UK courts have, over time, developed a rich and useful definition. 
 
3.2 Defining the Musical Work – UK Case Law 
The Imperial Copyright Act of 1911 brought the Berne Convention standards into UK law (as 
well as to the rest of the Empire, becoming the foundational copyright statute for nations as 
diverse as India, Israel and Ireland).
43
 It was followed by the Copyright Act of 1956.
44
 Neither 
Act, however, provided a definition of ‘musical work’. This changed in 1988 when the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) repealed the 1956 Act. Under the CDPA, a 
musical work is described as ‘a work consisting of music, exclusive of any words or action 
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intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music’.45  Nevertheless, the statute does 
not define what amounts to a piece of ‘music’.46  
 One advantage of the lack of a definition of ‘music’ within the CDPA is that it gives 
the courts leeway to take a broad interpretation of what is encompassed by a musical work.
47
 
The Court of Appeal decision in Sawkins v Hyperion
48
 is the most recent, authoritative 
decision on the nature of the musical work in the UK. In Sawkins, the claimant successfully 
argued that he owned the copyright in performing editions that he had prepared of public 
domain works originally composed by Michel-Richard Lalande during the early modern 
period. Mummery L.J. stated that ‘the essence of music is combining sounds for listening 
to’.49 He further remarked: 
{quotation}Music is not the same as mere noise. The sound of music is intended to 
produce effects of some kind on the listener’s emotions and intellect. The sounds may 
be produced by an organised performance on instruments played from a musical score, 
though that is not essential for the existence of the music or of copyright in it … There 
is no reason why, for example, a recording of a person’s spontaneous singing, 
whistling or humming or improvisations of sounds by a group of people with or 
without musical instruments should not be regarded as ‘music’ for copyright 
purposes.
50
{/quotation} 
 Clearly, this notion of music is not limited to harmony or melody. Mummery L.J. 
further stated that it would be incorrect to ‘single out the notes as uniquely significant for 
copyright purposes and to proceed to deny copyright to the other elements that make some 
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contribution to the sound of the music when performed, such as performing indications, 
tempo and performance practice indicators’.51 Therefore, in the UK the musical work can be 
described as broad and flexible: it can encompass not only notes of music, but also other 
elements of musical practice and performance.
52
  
 The UK courts’ open-minded view of music contrasts with the perspective of 
copyright taken by some scholars, who believe that the law imposes a necessarily ‘Romantic’ 
or 19th-century classical definition traced to the rise of individual authorship.
53
 For example, 
Goehr describes copyright’s musical work as ‘a self-sufficiently formed unity, expressive in 
its synthesised form and content of a genius’s idea’.54 Yet, as Bently remarks, ‘Mummery 
L.J.’s conception of the musical work’ in Sawkins ‘seems miles away from the image of the 
completed, notated score awaiting conversion by musical automatons – performers – into 
sounds appreciated by reverent, sedentary, passive audiences’.55 Therefore, rather than 
viewing it as unduly formalist, it is more accurate to regard the musical work under UK 
copyright as a fluid concept, influenced by a number of aesthetic and abstract notions of 
musical work present in ‘Romantic’ and classical musicological literature, but not bound by 
them.
56
 The reason this is a positive thing is that it is possible to envisage cases, e.g. involving 
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‘avant-garde’ music,57 where the provision of a strict definition of musical work might end up 
creating problems for judges, who may be unable to fit an avant-garde work within a formalist 
definition.
58
 By contrast, the UK courts’ broad notion of musical work gives the courts room 
to manoeuvre.  
 In light of this, if there are challenges that arise from the application of copyright to 
traditional music under UK law, it can be said with confidence that that these difficulties do 
not arise due to copyright’s definition of musical work. Nonetheless, as discussed further 
below, complexities can arise in relation to cases involving the distinction between two 
different types of musical work – the ‘composition’ and the ‘arrangement’ – as well as the 
twin notions of authorship and joint authorship. 
 
4. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE COMPOSITION AND THE ARRANGEMENT 
UNDER COPYRIGHT 
Of particular importance to discussions of traditional music and copyright is the distinction 
between the copyright in the musical composition and the copyright in a subsequent 
‘arrangement’ of that composition. Under UK law a separate copyright can subsist in an 
arrangement of a composition as long as the arrangement is sufficiently original
59
 and the 
requisite originality comes from the arranger.
60
 The owner of the original copyright in the 
composition is not the owner of the new arrangement copyright, which vests in the arranger.
61
 
In other words, copyright can recognise rights in multiple, original arrangements of the same 
composition.  
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 Key is the notion of originality underpinning this idea. Although the Berne 
Convention does not expressly state that there is a requirement of ‘originality’,62 there is ‘a 
clear indication’ that the notion of intellectual creation is ‘implicit in the conception of a 
literary or artistic work’.63 The same logic applies to a musical work. Crucially, whether one 
considers the traditional UK standard of ‘skill, labour and judgment’ or the CJEU standard of 
‘intellectual creation’ it is clear that the threshold is not a burdensome one in the musical 
context: music performance and composition are inherently creative and thus have little 
problem satisfying this test.
64
 Virtually any creative contribution to an existing tune or song 
will be sufficient for the arrangement to be protected. However, the effective use of this new 
arrangement copyright would be subject to licensing requirements because the copyright in 
the new arrangement does not replace or nullify the copyright in the underlying work. This 
means that an arranger of a copyright work must obtain a licence from the owner of the 
underlying copyright work in order to release the new arrangement because the right to make 
‘adaptations’ is one of the rights of the copyright owner.65 The only exception to this is if the 
new arrangement is based on a public domain work; if this is the case then the arranger will 
own the copyright in the arrangement, with no requirement to obtain a licence (though 
copyright only covers the original elements of the new arrangement - the underlying work 
remains in the public domain). 
 The conflict between these rights – the right of adaptation and the automatic 
protection of new original arrangements – has long been acknowledged. At the time of Berne 
                                                 
62
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‘musical arrangements’ were not protected as original works;66 they were merely viewed as 
potentially ‘unauthorised indirect appropriations of works’ i.e. as examples of infringement.67 
However, following the Berlin Revision of the Berne Convention, arrangements were given 
protection under Article 2(3) as original works, ‘without prejudice to the copyright in the 
original work’.68 This debate over the terms of Berne underlines the fact that a new 
arrangement of a copyright composition can simultaneously be an ‘original’ work in its own 
right, and also an ‘infringing’ work with respect to the underlying copyright in the 
composition (unless it is properly licensed). 
 
4.1 Authorship and Joint Authorship of Musical Arrangements 
As noted earlier, an arranger can be the author of, and can own copyright in, an original 
arrangement of a public domain song/tune, though not the song/tune itself, which remains in 
the public domain. In theory, the arrangement copyright includes the right to object to ‘sound-
a-like’ records which mimic the particular arrangement. However, such cases can be difficult 
to prove.
69
 
 There have been a number of UK music copyright cases where a particular 
arrangement of a composition has been the subject of a legal dispute. For example, in both 
Godfrey v Lees
70
 and Beckingham v Hodgens
71
 the disputes centred on the authorship of the 
specific copyright arrangements of existing songs. At the same time, courts have sometimes 
found it difficult to clarify the distinction between the underlying work and an arrangement, 
especially in joint authorship cases involving music. The nature of music performance as a 
group activity can lead to confusion over who is an author, and thus a copyright owner, and 
who is a mere performer, and thus not entitled to copyright protection. 
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 In Hadley v Kemp,
72
 a number of the members of the group Spandau Ballet took a 
copyright case against their fellow band member and principal songwriter, Gary Kemp. 
During the early 1980s, Kemp had written the lyrics, chords and basic melody to the song 
‘True’, one of the group’s biggest hits, and one of the works cited in the case. The key dispute 
over ‘True’ concerned its famous saxophone solo, which was performed on the recording by 
Steve Norman, a band member. The solo was significant – it lasted for 16 bars, approximately 
9% of the song. Moreover, the melody of the solo was devised and improvised in the studio 
by Norman over the chords that Kemp presented to him. Despite Norman’s creativity, the 
court took the view that Kemp was the ‘author’ and Norman was a mere ‘performer’. Thus, it 
was held that the creation of the solo was not a ‘significant and original contribution’ to the 
work. Norman was left without a share in the copyright work. 
 As Arnold states, ‘in assessing claims to co-authorship of musical works, the vital first 
step is for the court correctly to identify the work the subject of the claim to copyright and to 
distinguish it from any antecedent work’.73 One of the reasons the Hadley judgment is 
problematic is that it is unclear as to whether the court considered the musical work, as 
composed and recorded in ‘demo’ form by Kemp, to be the same ‘work’ as the eventual 
version of ‘True’, as recorded by the entire band, or whether the eventual band recording was 
an original ‘arrangement’ of Kemp’s composition.74 In addition, on the author/performer 
distinction, the onerous ‘significant and original’ requirement placed on the saxophonist went 
far beyond the ordinary standard of originality under copyright – another reason to doubt the 
validity of Park J.’s decision.75 
 Thankfully, the more recent case of Fisher v Brooker
76
 – a case with similar facts to 
Hadley – provided clarity regarding how to assess musical arrangements in the context of 
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joint authorship. In Fisher, authorship of the famous 1960s song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ 
was disputed. Gary Brooker had always been credited with the copyright in the musical work 
because he wrote the chords and melody of the song. According to Brooker, he recorded this 
as a bare ‘demo’, and presented it in the studio to the other band members, who then 
performed on the final recorded and released work – ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’. The song is 
famous for its organ instrumental sections, which were not part of the song at the time the 
demo was recorded, but were instead improvised by band member Matthew Fisher during the 
performance and recording process. Therefore, as in Hadley, the instrumental sections in 
question were created by a band member (Fisher) in response and counterpoint to a chord 
structure devised by the main songwriter of the group (Brooker).
77
 
 Unfortunately, it its analysis the High Court in Fisher did not properly disentangle the 
composition, as represented by the demo, from the arrangement, as represented by the final 
recorded work. Thankfully, this was rectified by the Court of Appeal, which maintained a 
clear distinction between the demo and the final arrangement, and ultimately upheld the claim 
of Fisher that he ought to be viewed as a joint author and owner of the eventual recorded and 
arranged work known as ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’.78 
 The principle that Fisher highlights is that ‘it will often be the case that a recorded 
piece of music created through performance is sufficiently original over any antecedent 
musical work to attract copyright’.79 Again, this is not to say that the antecedent work will no 
longer have copyright protection; in fact, both works will have copyright protection, though 
as noted earlier, the owner of the subsequent or ‘derivative’ work will usually have to pay a 
licence fee for the use of the underlying, antecedent work. Thus, in Fisher the eventual 
famous version of the song, which Fisher contributed to and which was released as a hit 
single, would have required a licence for the use of Brooker’s original musical work, as 
presented in the demo recording. To resolve this, the Court of Appeal held that various 
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implied licences had been granted by the parties to each other over the prior 40-year period, 
and that these licences were only revoked once litigation between the parties commenced.
80
 
This further underscores the significance of licensing to cases involving musical 
arrangements. 
 
5. PROTECTING TRADITIONAL MUSIC UNDER COPYRIGHT—CAN THE LAW AID 
MUSICIANS TO FACILITATE THE TRADITIONAL PROCESS? 
What cases such as Sawkins and Fisher demonstrate is that (i) the definitions of music and 
musical work under the CDPA are broad and encompassing; (ii) arrangements can be 
protected as separate musical works to the underlying work; and (iii) the low threshold of 
originality will often be satisfied by the creative act of the performer(s) under the terms of 
authorship/joint authorship. 
 These three points give credence to the argument that there is nothing about 
traditional music of itself that makes it unprotectable under copyright law. Original 
arrangements of traditional works – whether public domain works or those in copyright – are 
clearly protected by copyright. However, this has consequences: where there are multiple 
arrangements of an original tune/song which is still under copyright, the law says that licences 
are required from the copyright owner of that original tune/song. Furthermore, if a later 
arrangement featured original elements of an earlier arrangement, a licence would need to be 
granted by the earlier arranger. Given how important arrangements of songs/tunes are to the 
practices of traditional music in a wide range of contexts – including US blues81 and jazz,82 
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North American fiddle music,
83
 and Irish traditional music
84
 – this issue of licensing cannot 
be ignored. If all arrangers of traditional music attempted to enforce their arrangements of 
traditional songs and tunes against others, it would severely affect the processes of traditional 
music, which rely on free sharing of tunes, variations and, effectively, arrangements.
85
 
 An empirical study I carried out with Irish traditional musicians during 2007-2011 
demonstrates that one of the reasons why traditional music is shared so freely is the existence 
of social norms of sharing and reciprocity.
86
 These norms are valued highly. At the same time, 
many Irish traditional musicians do record albums and perform in commercial settings, so 
some knowledge of copyright is necessary. The empirical data I gathered from 2007-2011 
show that although musicians might seek to enforce their rights over e.g. a composition or 
arrangement if used in a film or TV programme, musicians rarely do so when their 
compositions/arrangements are recorded on albums, or are performed at gigs/festivals, by 
their fellow musicians. The work of Toynbee and Okpaluba shows that similar traits can be 
observed in other musical contexts.
87
 
 Even if the norms are paramount, given that their compositions and arrangements are 
protected by copyright law, is there anything further that musicians working in a traditional 
idiom can do to balance their rights with those of the wider community or network? One 
plausible way in which composers and arrangers could try to ensure the traditional modes of 
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sharing and reciprocity continue is to license their works openly using an alternative licensing 
system.
88
 
 
5.1 How Alternative Licensing Systems Work 
As Kelty states, alternative licensing systems ‘rely on the existence of intellectual property to 
create and maintain the “commons” … even as they occupy a position of challenge or 
resistance to the dominant forms of intellectual property’.89 Hence, alternative licensing 
systems do not attempt to break away completely from intellectual property, but instead they 
attempt to bend IP so that it can be tailored to suit individual or collective creators. 
Alternative licences, such as the ‘free and open-source software’ (FOSS) licences, have 
proven very successful, with prominent examples including Unix/Linux
90
 and Google’s 
Android operating system.
91
 Perhaps the most influential licence is the GNU General Public 
Licence, which allows the creators of FOSS to release their software with ‘open-source’ code 
that can be improved by subsequent programmers working along the chain.
92
 
 It is notable that the FOSS movement thrives because it is a based upon a kind of 
community ethos. Indeed, social norms of sharing, responsibility and reciprocity are crucial to 
the success of community-based creativity within FOSS.
93
 FOSS licences facilitate shared 
creativity – something that, like traditional music, could be described as a chain of 
authorship. 
 The most prominent attempt to bring the ethos of FOSS to other cultural fields is the 
Creative Commons (CC) licence, a type of alternative licence for a wide range of creative 
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works, including music, film and literature. CC is founded upon the principle of using 
licences to enable creators to claim ‘some rights reserved’ rather than ‘all rights reserved’.94 
Today CC is the most widely known and widely used type of alternative licence for artistic 
works.
95
 
 Under a CC licence, copyright in the work typically remains with the author, but the 
author can choose one of the CC licences in order to regulate further uses of the work by other 
artists or users.
96 
CC licences are provided in three forms: first in legal language; secondly in 
clear, readable language; and thirdly, as ‘machine-readable’ content. The terms of the CC 
licence are for the initial author to choose. For instance, it is possible for an author to retain 
only the attribution right, and to allow all - even commercial - uses of the work.
97
 In contrast, 
it is possible to restrict all rights except non-commercial distribution. Therefore, the core 
aspects of a CC licence are the terms covering attribution, non-commercial reproduction and 
derivative use. In addition, the licences entrench the idea of ‘share-alike’.98 This share-alike 
notion envisages that ‘derivative works’ – akin to works created under the UK adaptation 
right, and thus relevant to arrangements – can be created using the licensed work, as long as 
these derivative works are themselves licensed under the same CC terms.  
 Thus far, several courts, including those in the US and the Netherlands, have accepted 
such alternate licences as being legally valid.
99
 Nonetheless, CC licences still pose some 
difficulties. As noted earlier, under CC licences works are protected by the underlying 
copyright law, but are licensed contractually under a set of terms chosen by the licensor. In 
this context, the question of what each term – for example, ‘commercial use’ – means is 
crucial. To take this one example, CC defines ‘commercial use’ as use exercised ‘in any 
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manner that is primarily intended for, or directed toward, commercial advantage or private 
monetary compensation’.100 Yet, different jurisdictions may interpret and define this term in 
their own ways, and the boundary between ‘commercial’ and ‘non-commercial’ may not 
always be clear.
101
 Moreover, jurisdictions may disagree over principles of copyright law 
itself – for instance, UK judges typically take a different interpretation of the moral right of 
integrity when compared with the courts in France.
102
 These factors mean that legal 
uniformity is far from certain. To try to ensure better compatibility with domestic laws some 
‘local’ versions of CC licences have been developed, but uncertainty remains.103 
 Furthermore, the terms of collective licensing vary from territory to territory. For 
instance, in France, authors generally do not ‘fragment’ their body of work for ‘independent 
management of the parts’.104 The same is largely true in the UK and Ireland with respect to 
PRS for Music and IMRO.
105
 This reduces flexibility – if the author wishes to release one 
work under a CC licence, he or she may be ‘thwarted by his or her status as a member of a 
collecting society’.106 Even if authors do succeed in disaggregating the licences for their 
works, this has the potential disadvantage of increasing complexity for users. Indeed, the large 
number of different CC licences that are available can make it difficult for users to 
comprehend precisely which uses are acceptable and legal.
107
 To try to assuage concerns over 
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this, CC has created a database of works/licences to make this task easier for users. 
Nonetheless, in some circumstances a potential user may have to contact the copyright holder 
directly, which may be inconvenient and burdensome.
108
 Thus, while the CC licence system is 
a ‘worthy’ attempt at creating a universal alternative licence for creative works, it is not 
without its own difficulties.
109
 
 
6. WHY ALTERNATIVE LICENSING IS NOT A PANACEA – FORMALITY AND 
INFORMALITY 
There is little doubt that CC licences can apply to musical works – some of the most visible 
successes of CC licensed works include works by popular musicians such as Radiohead
110
 
and Nine Inch Nails.
111
 Moreover, given the centrality of reciprocity, the idea of utilizing an 
alternative licensing system like CC is potentially attractive in the traditional music context 
because traditional composers/arrangers are unlikely to want to avail of all the rights 
associated with copyright, and CC gives composers/arrangers the choice to license their 
works as they choose.
112
 
 For example, a composer could, via CC, stipulate that his/her composition should be 
freely usable by other musicians in non-commercial contexts while retaining attribution rights 
and rights over commercial uses. An arranger could do the same. On the face of it, this 
certainly has the potential to prove useful in the context of traditional music. Nevertheless, 
there are reasons to be sceptical about the overall benefit of utilizing such licences in 
traditional music contexts. 
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 For one thing, the challenge of defining the key terms of CC licences – in other words 
‘commercial use’ – would not be any easier to overcome in the case of traditional music.113 If 
a CC licence for a traditional song only allows ‘free, non-commercial use’ this could end up 
creating complications since, as noted earlier, many traditional musicians do in fact release 
recordings on LP, CD or mp3, and these ‘uses’ may fall into the ‘commercial use’ bracket.114 
As a result, a musician who records an arrangement of another musician’s CC-licensed 
composition may breach this term. 
 There is a more fundamental reason to be sceptical of CC in the context of traditional 
music. As noted earlier, it is the informal social norms of sharing and reciprocity that are key 
to the processes of Irish traditional music.
115
 A similar trait can be observed in other 
traditional contexts.
116
 CC, by contrast, could have the effect of entrenching the primacy of 
individual property rights, and thus, formalising the system of free sharing that occurs within 
traditional music networks of, for example, Irish or North American fiddle players or jazz 
trumpet players. Here it is worth recalling the old adage that a ‘leaky’ copyright system works 
best.
117
 To some extent CC licences effectively ‘fill in the gaps’ left by the copyright system, 
something that may lead to the entrenching of individual property rights in areas where 
individual authors have generally ignored copyright. For example, in traditional contexts 
where there has been no financial incentive to enforce copyright, composers and arrangers 
have sometimes allowed, or even encouraged, their fellow musicians perform, re-arrange, and 
record their music freely, while enforcing rights against broadcasters and film and TV 
companies for soundtrack use. Such scenarios could be described as the ‘leaky’ copyright 
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system working well.
118
 By contrast, encouraging the use of a new formal system of licensing 
may have unforeseen negative effects – it may even reduce the flexibility of ‘free sharing’ 
within the network. In other words, the informal, non-enforcement of copyright, which under 
traditional music is governed by flexible social norms, may become a formal, rigid system via 
alternative licensing.
119
 Rather than facilitating ‘open’ culture, CC could lead to greater 
cultural ‘commodification’ by encouraging small-scale creators, many of whom have largely 
ignored IP in the past, to claim some formal rights over their works.
120
 
 It is also worth noting that CC, for all its grand aspirations, has only been a modest 
and uneven success. The iconic alternative licensing success stories have been communally 
created software and online knowledge projects such as Wikipedia, not CC-licensed creative 
works. With this realisation in mind, one conclusion to draw is that the type of licensed ‘peer 
production’ envisaged by Benkler may be more easily applicable in the context of software 
and web-based knowledge outlets than in other cultural contexts.
121
 Perhaps it is also 
significant that software is a recorded product, and therefore susceptible to ‘wrapping up’ in 
licence terms, whereas music is essentially intangible, and for this reason perhaps less 
amenable to a pure licensing solution. In any event, for the reasons given, while CC should 
not be entirely ruled out as potentially useful to traditional musicians, neither should it be 
embraced wholeheartedly. Musicians should approach it cautiously, and if they do choose to 
avail themselves of it, carefully consider what uses they want their fellow musicians to make 
of their works. 
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7. CONCLUSION: REFLECTING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NORMS OF 
SHARING AND RECIPROCITY 
This chapter has demonstrated that copyright can, and does, protect works of traditional 
music, whether new compositions or original arrangements of traditional works. However, 
since traditional music emerges in the context of free sharing of songs and tunes, I have 
posited a key question: what would happen if these copyrights were enforced? The answer is 
that it would disrupt the practices of traditional musicians. As I have shown, arrangements of 
songs/tunes are crucial to traditional music in a wide range of contexts – including US 
blues
122
 and jazz,
123
 North American fiddle music,
124
 and Irish traditional music.
125
 If all 
arrangers of traditional music attempted to enforce their arrangements of traditional 
songs/tunes against others, it would severely affect the process of traditional music, which 
relies on free sharing.
126
 
At the same time, while the use of alternative licensing systems, such as CC, is an 
option for traditional musicians, it does not necessarily provide the optimum solution. The 
legal challenges of multi-jurisdictional licensing, and the problem of bring formal legal 
concerns to an environment that has thrived on informal sharing, mean that CC is far from 
being a panacea. In fact, taking inspiration from the work of Elinor Ostrom, I argue that where 
a collective resource is being shared successfully – as it is in many traditional music contexts 
– the law should be akin to a bystander, rather than an active player.127 Ultimately, for 
traditional music to continue to thrive, the informal norms of sharing and reciprocity are what 
must be encouraged and maintained – not the cold formality of the law. 
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